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Abstract 
The US international investment position today should in principle be equal to the sum of past current 
account balances (mostly deficits). However, this is by far not the case even taking into account the 
balancing item ‘errors and omissions’. Between 1982 and 2004, the US has accumulated a grand total of 
around $4.5 trillion (thousand billion). (The sum of current account deficits has been about $1 trillion 
smaller than the amount of net sales of US assets to the rest of the world because of the anomaly in 
reinvested earning.) Despite this accumulation of deficits the US net international debtor position (IIP) 
has deteriorated ‘only’ by $2.7 billion (and is now estimated – at the end of 2004, end 2005 figures are 
not yet available for the US IIP – at ‘only’ around $2.5 trillion). This implies a total of ‘unearned’ gains 
to the US of around $1.8 trillion during 22 years. The quite detailed data available for a somewhat 
shorter period (1989-2004) show that only a very small part of this sum, around 10-20%, can be 
explained by exchange rate and stock market changes.  
One must thus conclude that the US has acted like a black hole for capital from the rest of the world: one 
can observe a large amount of investment flowing into the US, but after some time it disappears from the 
statistics (and foreign investment in the US that takes the form of FDI earns almost no return). The 
discrepancy arises for a simple reason: the flow data are based on actual flows of payments recorded in 
the balance of payments. By contrast, the stock data (on the US international investment position) are 
based on US surveys, which tend to miss out on US assets held by foreigners. This implies that it is 
likely that the true US net debtor position is significantly larger than officially reported.  
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Summary 
he global financial system seems to have a black hole at its heart, i.e. in the US. Over the 
last two decades, US residents have sold a total of around $5.5 trillion (thousand billion) 
worth net of IOUs to foreigners. Yet, the officially recorded net investment position of 
the US has deteriorated only by a little over one-half of this amount ($2.8 trillion) over the same 
period. The US capital market seems to have worked like a black hole for investors from the rest 
of world in which $2.7 trillion have vanished from sight – or at least from the official statistics.  
How can $2.7 trillion disappear? 
It is often argued that the US simply can make large capital gains on its gross positions, because 
its assets are in foreign currency and its liabilities denominated in USD. However, the available 
data indicate that over the last two decades this factor can have netted the US at most $300-400 
billion. This leaves a loss of over $2 trillion to be explained. The ‘explanation’ comes in two 
tranches of about $1 trillion each:  
i.  An anomaly in the accounting item ‘reinvested earnings’ in the balance of payments, 
which improves the US current account by about $50-100 billon per annum because 
foreign firms report systematically very low profits for their US-owned operations. 
ii.  Very large residual, ‘other’, or rather unexplained, changes recorded by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis in its statistics on the net US international investment position, 
which have averaged a similar order of magnitude. 
This note deals with the second element (the first is analysed in a companion paper – see Gros, 
2006).  
Could the puzzle be due to inaccurate balance of payment statistics? This is unlikely because the 
financial flows are just the mirror image of the current account which has been closely 
scrutinised over the last years given the large reported global current account discrepancy that 
arose over the late 1990s. The global current account balance discrepancy has now almost 
totally disappeared and even taking it into account for the 1990s would make little difference 
given the size of the US current account deficits over the last years. It is more likely that the 
statistics on the net US IIP are collected in a manner that tends to miss foreign-owned assets. It 
is thus likely that the true US net external debtor position is closer to 35-40% of GDP than the 
22% reported officially. 
 
T  
| 1 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE US (I): 
DISAPPEARING IN A BLACK HOLE? 
DANIEL GROS 
1. Introduction 
The object of study of this note is a gaping stock flow inconsistency in the US international 
accounts. The US net international investment position (IIP) should in principle be equal to the 
sum of past current account balances (mostly deficits). However, this is by far not the case. 
Since 1982, the US has accumulated a grand total of around $4.5 trillion ($4.5 thousand billion) 
of current account deficits. But its net international debtor position has deteriorated during the 
period ‘only’ by $2.7 billion (and is now estimated at ‘only’ around $2.5 trillion). This implies a 
total of ‘unearned’ gains to the US of around $1.8 trillion during 22 years. Taking into account 
the balancing item ‘errors and omissions’ does not significantly affect this conclusion since over 
this period this item has summed to less than $250 billion, thus leaving a hole of close to $1.6 
trillion. 
What can explain the approximately $1.6 trillion in vanishing deficits? The short answer is that 
this difference cannot be explained. It is as if the US capital market was a black hole: inflows 
disappear without leaving a trace. For a more detailed description of how this happens, it is 
necessary to restrict attention to a somewhat shorter period, for which more detailed data are 
available, namely 1989-2004. Over this 15-year period, the US accumulated current account 
deficits totalling $3.7 trillion, but its net IIP deteriorated only by about $2.5 billion. The lost 
capital amounts thus ‘only' to about $1.2 trillion since 1989. Given the last of detailed data for 
the period between 1982 and 1989, all one can say is that the US accumulated current account 
deficits of around $700 billion, but its net IIP (according to today’s data) deteriorated only by 
$100 billion, leaving around $600 billion of unexplained gains.  
These discrepancies are much larger than what one can observe for other countries. For 
example, Japan has accumulated current account surpluses worth around $2 trillion and its 
official net international investment position is very close to this amount. Table A1 in the annex 
provides more details and the data from Germany where the stock flow discrepancy is even 
smaller. 
2.  Potential explanations: US capital gains? 
Given the better data availability for 1989-2004, the remainder of this note concentrates on this 
shorter period and the $1.2 trillion of missing deficits. An excellent starting point is a recent 
tabulation by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the US Department of Commerce, 
which shows the main sources of changes in the net US IIP which is reproduced in Table 1. The 
second column of this table shows for each year the financial flows that ‘balance’ the current 
account (minus errors and omissions, whose sum over this period was negligible). The last entry 
in this column shows the cumulated financial flows, or the cumulated current account deficits, 
whose sum amounts to $3.744 trillion over these 15 years. The last column in this table shows 
the net US IIP position at the end of each year. Comparing the beginning 1989 to the end 2004 
value shows that the deterioration has been $2,542 billion, approximately $1.2 trillion less than 
the sum of the current accounts. The explanation (or rather the lack thereof) lies in the columns 
(b)-(d). 2 | DANIEL GROS 
Table 1. Components of changes in the net international investment position with direct 
investment at market value, 1989-2004 ($ billions) 
Changes in position 
Attributable to 
Valuation adjustments 
Financial 
flows  Price 
changes 
Exchange 
rate 
changes
1 
Other 
changes
2 
Total  Year  Position 
Beginning 
(a) (b) (c) (d)  (a+b+c+d) 
Position 
Ending 
1989  10  -50 7 -15 0 -57  -47 
1990 -47  -60  -149  57  34  -118  -164 
1991 -164  -46  -96  5  41  -96  -261 
1992 -261  -96  -76  -75  55  -191  -452 
1993  -452  -81 293 -22 119 308  -144 
1994 -144  -127  23  73  40  9  -135 
1995 -135  -86  -152  39  29  -171  -306 
1996 -306  -138  84  -66  65  -54  -360 
1997 -360  -221  -92  -208  58  -463  -823 
1998 -823  -70  -288  68  41  -248 -1,071 
1999 -1,071  -236  330  -126  66  33  -1,037 
2000 -1,037  -486  134  -271  80  -544  -1,581 
2001 -1,581  -400  -224  -152  18  -758  -2,339 
2002  -2,339 -500 -60  231 213 -116  -2,455 
2003 -2,455  -561  -2  416  230  83  -2,372 
2004 -2,372  -585  147  272  -4  -170  -2,542 
 Sum  total  -3,744  -121  227  1,086  -2,553   
1 Represents gains or losses on foreign-currency-denominated assets and liabilities due to their revaluation at current 
exchange rates. 
2 Includes changes in coverage, capital gains and losses of direct investment affiliates, and other adjustments to the 
value of assets and value of assets and liabilities 
Source: www.bea.gov. Data are consistent with those published in “The International Investment Position of the 
United States at year end 2004”, in the July 2005 issue of the Survey of Current Business.  
 
A number of recent analyses of the US external position have emphasised that the US could 
gain from exchange rate movements because most of its assets are in USD, but a large part of its 
liabilities are in foreign currency. However, this can only be a partial explanation because by 
end 2004, the US dollar was not far from the value it had already attained during the early 
1990s. The last entry in column (c) in Table 1 shows indeed that since 1989, the net gain from 
exchange rate changes for the US IIP has been only a bit over $220 billion. 
Could the US have benefited from differential movements in stock markets? This is also 
unlikely a priory as the US stock market has not performed worse than its foreign counterparts. 
The last entry in column (b) in Table 1 confirms that this is indeed not the case as the effect of 
the sum of the capital gains and losses over this time period has been to reduce the US net IIP 
by around $0.12 trillion.  
This implies that, even taking into account gains from capital revaluation, one cannot explain 
why the discrepancy between the cumulated current account deficit and the present net IIP of 
the US is that large. The last entry in column (d) in Table 1 shows that over this period the sum 
of those changes in the US IIP that cannot be explained either by stock markets or by exchange 
rate changes, is equal to close to $1.1 trillion. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE US | 3 
 
The continuously growing importance of the entry ‘other changes’ is illustrated in Figure1, 
which shows the cumulated US current account deficits and the net IIP over time. Two series 
for the IIP are shown. The first one, labelled, net IIP shows the official figures. The second one, 
labelled ‘net IIP without ‘other changes’ cumulated’, is calculated as the net official net IIP but 
without the item ‘other changes from the BEA statistics, i.e. without the changes that can be 
explained by exchange rate movements and stock market price adjustments. The item ‘other 
changes’ is available from the BEA only since 1989. The second series starts thus only in that 
year. It is apparent that the difference between these two estimates of the US net IIP grows 
continuously over time. The difference between these two measures of the IIP increases 
particularly since 2001, with the official net IIP barely deteriorating since that year, despite 
cumulated current account deficits of around $1.6 trillion over only 3 years. Part of this 
discrepancy can be explained by the large exchange rate gain the US made when the dollar 
started to depreciate rapidly. However, other changes were also an important factor, improving 
the US net position by about $400 billion over this period. 
Figure 1. Cumulated US current account deficits and net international investment position 
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Source: IFS database. 
3.  A case study: Revisions for data for the year 2000  
The key to understanding the size of the item ‘other changes’ lies in the fact that the data on 
financial flows come from a completely different source than that on the net international 
investment position (IIP). The latter is essentially based on surveys organised by the New York 
Federal Reserve. The size of foreign portfolio investment in the US is thus estimated on the 
basis of reports from US-based custodians, who are asked to detail the securities they hold on 
behalf of foreign owners. By contrast, the data on financial flows is based on the reports of 
brokers when they sell securities to foreigners. A share of a US company held by a European 
would thus not appear in the US IIP if the share is not held with a US-based custodian. But the 
purchase of the share would have been recorded in the balance of payments as a flow in the year 
the purchase took place.  4 | DANIEL GROS 
Measuring the value of foreign ownership of US real estate is even more difficult (unless it is 
held for business purposes). The balance of payments would record the acquisition, but the 
surveys used for the IIP would have no way of accounting for it. It is thus apparent that the 
surveys will tend over time to miss part of foreign-owned assets in the US. However, as the 
BEA takes the surveys as the best source, it is forced to introduce the item ‘other adjustments’ 
in order to reconcile the data on the IIP with those from the balance of payments. 
BEA comments annually in detail on the sources of changes in the net IIP. However, this is 
done usually only for the last year and in most cases the (perhaps preliminary) data almost 
always indicate that ‘other changes’ are not that important. It is therefore not possible to follow 
the changes over time. However, a comparison of the data for a specific year (in this case 2000) 
as reported by the BEA at two different points in time is instructive. This is done in Table 2.  
Table 2. Detail of the revisions concerning the US IIP for the year 2000 between 2005 and 2001 
($ billions) 
  Jul-01 Jul-05  Difference 
Net position*  -2,187.4 -1,581.0  606.4 
Total US assets abroad*  7,189.8 7,401.2  211.4 
of which:       
1. US private assets  6,976.2 7,187.6  211.4 
US FDI abroad  2,467.8 2,694.0  226.2 
Foreign securities  2,406.5 2,425.5  19.0 
Total US liabilities*     
of which:        
1. Foreign official assets  922.4 1,030.7 108.3 
US gov. securities  676.9 756.2  79.3 
2. Other (non official-private) foreign US liabilities  8,454.8 7,951.5  -503.3 
of which;       
FDI at market value  2,736.9 2,783.2  46.3 
US Treasury securities  639.7 381.6 -258.1 
US  non-Treasury securities  2,964.0 2,623.0  -341.0 
Corporate and other bonds  1,374.3  1,068.6  -305.7 
Corporate stocks  1,589.7  1,554.4  -35.3 
(*) with FDI at market value. 
Source: Own calculations on BEA data. 
 
The July 2001 issue of the Survey of Current Business contained a first release, which estimated 
the net US debtor position for end 2000 at roughly $2.2 trillion (with FDI evaluated at market 
prices, the preferred measure of FDI by the BEA and most observers). However, the July 2005 
issue of the Survey of Current Business reports that at the end of 2000, the net debtor position of 
the US was only around $1.6 trillion, $600 billion less than previously reported. What was the 
main source of this massive improvement in the US IIP? The detail reported in Table 2 shows 
that this was due mainly to two items: The estimate of the value of US FDI abroad in the year 
2000 increased by around $200 billion between July 2001 and 2005. More astonishing is 
another change: the reported value US liabilities (always at end 2000) fell by around $400 
billion. Most of this was due to a fall in the value of foreign portfolio investment in the US 
(mostly bonds, but also some stocks). The most likely reason for the fall in reported holdings of 
corporate bonds (over a quarter of the total) is probably simply that these bonds were not held 
by US custodians (to avoid tax on the interest income?).  FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE US | 5 
 
4.  Stock flow discrepancies by major investment category 
The cumulative financial flows should add up to the end of period stock provided the returns are 
properly accounted for each period. These returns should appear in the income part of the 
current account and the data so far have shown a declining, but persistent surplus despite the 
large and increasing (even if under-reported) official net debtor position. The absence of a 
deficit on the income is largely due to an anomaly in the item ‘reinvested earnings’ of which 
foreign firms tend to report, on average, close to zero, whereas US firms report large reinvested 
earnings from their operations. In the following it will be assumed that this is not just due to 
massaging of accounts for tax purposes, but corresponds to reality.  
A companion note (see Gros, 2006) argues that this is actually highly unlikely to be the case as 
it would imply that foreigners instantly start losing when they invest more than 10% into a US 
company. This conclusion seems unavoidable given that the rate of return on US portfolio assets 
has been the same as the rate on US portfolio liabilities. Direct investment is any transaction 
under which a foreigner acquires more than 10% of the capital of an enterprise. It seems that 
foreign investors in the US get a market rate of return (which can be objectively measured) 
when they acquire less than 10% of a corporation. But the official statistics (based on 
accounting data) imply that their returns are much lower once the investment qualifies as direct, 
i.e. once it goes above the 10% threshold. 
However, accounting for FDI does not seem to be the main source for the missing trillion 
dollars (the difference between financial flows and the change in the net asset position). Table 3 
below goes as far back as possible for the financial flows (namely 1975) and shows that the 
official data on the US net investment position in FDI are rather close to what one obtains by 
summing past flows (and if one follows the procedure used by the BEA to revalue investment 
using stock market indices and account for reinvested earnings). The unexplained part that 
remains is actually rather close to the official data for the US net investment position in FDI in 
1975. Yet, it is surprising that in all the other categories, the net US position is much better than 
one would expect by summing the flows (and adjusting them for stock market movements in the 
case of portfolio equity). The total sum of the unexplained parts (over $1.4 trillion) is actually 
somewhat larger than the figure mentioned above because the phenomenon of disappearing 
foreign investment in the US seems to have taken place even before 1982 (earliest year with 
data for FDI at market value) and 1989 (earliest year with detailed data on capital gains due to 
exchange rates and stock markets). Table A2 in the annex provides further detail separating out 
assets and liabilities and accounting for stock market movements. Since stock market 
movements are based on other stock markets translated into USD, this implies that the data used 
here implicitly also account for exchange rate changes, which as already shown above, have not 
been as important as often thought. 
Table 3. Cumulative financial flows 1975-2004 and the net international investment position 
($ billions): Detail by financial instrument 
   Cumulative 
flows 
(1975-2004)
Revalued 
cumulative flows 
(at market value) 
Revalued with 
discounting 
for dividends 
IIP (at 
end 
2004) 
Unexplained 
part 
FDI ( including reinvested earnings)  196  428  727  888  161 
Portfolio flows:of which          
Equity  271 24    449  425 
Portfolio debt  -3,571     -3,334  237 
Other investment  -1,039        -448  591 
Grand total  -4,143      -2,445  1,414 
Source: Own calculations based on IMF BoP data. 6 | DANIEL GROS 
At first sight, the large discrepancy in the category ‘Other investment’ is particularly surprising 
since about two-thirds of the flows under this category consist of bank transactions, which 
should be very well documented. But a significant part of ‘other investment’ in the BoP consists 
of real estate, which, as argued above, is particularly likely to be missed by the surveys used to 
establish the IIP. But it is impossible to establish this in more detail since, unfortunately, the IIP 
data for this category is incomplete. (What appears to be the biggest item on the asset side of the 
IIP does not exist on the liability side, and, the biggest item in the IIP other assets is loans to 
banks, but this is missing under the liabilities side.) 
All in all, this more detailed examination of potential reasons why foreign investment in the US 
tends to disappear from the official IIP statistics only confirms the conclusion reached from the 
BEA data above: more than $1 trillion of investment that has flown over the last decades into 
the US has disappeared (at least from the statistics). 
5.  What does it mean? 
Since stock flows discrepancies arise quite often in economic statistics, one might be tempted to 
just dismiss the data inconsistency reported here as just another instance. However, the 
evolution of the US net debtor position has assumed a particular relevance given the large US 
current account deficits. Any analysis of the sustainability of the US situation must start from 
data on its current net debtor position. This has been done in a number of recent studies, which 
have generally concluded that the US net debtor position, expressed as a share of GDP, is 
deteriorating drastically. In this context it matters whether the US starts with a net IIP of ‘only’ 
$2.5 trillion, 22% of GDP, or whether it is $3.5 trillion or about 30% of GDP (without the 
unexplained gains). 
Another potential reading of the data reported here is that the future will be like the past: the 
officially reported net US IIP will always deteriorate much less than one would expect from the 
combined effect of current account deficits and identifiable capital gains from exchange rates 
and stock markets. If this were the case, one would really have to consider the US capital 
market like a black hole that devours the savings gravitating around it. In astrophysics, it is 
generally not possible to measure the mass of a black hole since matter disappears in it. The 
only way to measure its mass would be to observe it from the beginning, measuring at each 
instant all the matter it attracts. Transposed to the case at hand, this would imply that 
cumulating financial flows into the US should give a more accurate picture of its net debtor 
position (its weight) than trying to measure its weight via the surveys used to establish the 
official statistics on the net US international investment position.  
| 7 
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Annex 
Table A1. An international comparison of the stock flow discrepancy 
   2004  ∆ (CUM CU and Net IIP)  ratio 
Germany        
 CUM  Current  Account  180.9  44.7  6.2 
  ∆ Net IIP  136.2     
  CUM Current Acc.( Absolute)  722.7     
        
Japan        
 CUM  Current  Account  2,061.1  289.2  13.8 
  ∆ Net IIP  1,772.0     
  CUM ABS Current Acc  2,100.1     
        
UK        
 CUM  Current  Account  -402.6  -87.0 -17.9 
  ∆ Net IIP  -315.7     
  CUM ABS Current Acc  486.1     
        
US        
  CUM Current Account  -4,504.7  -1,596.9  -35.0 
  ∆ Net IIP  -2,907.8     
  CUM ABS Current Acc  4,567.8     
 
Table A2 below shows separately for assets and liabilities the stock flow differences for major 
investment categories. It seems that, if one accepts the official BEA methodology to revalue 
FDI including the anomaly in reinvested earnings, one can account for the reported value of FDI 
rather well. However, there seem to be more problems in the other categories, which in principle 
are easier to measure. Portfolio equity positions seem to be much larger than one would expect 
given the reported flows (even if adjusted for stock market gains). This table also shows that 
there is very little difference in the average age of US assets and liabilities. For FDI, the average 
is exactly the same (1997) and it is only in portfolio equity that one can detect a difference of 
one year between the average age of inflows (1999) and outflows (1998). But any losses 
foreigners might have made on the US stock market by investing close to the height of the boom 
should be accounted for by the stock market adjustment in the second column. Hence, this 
(minute) age difference cannot account for the large discrepancy in the stock data. 
 
 FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE US | 9 
 
Table A2. Stock flow discrepancy by major category of capital flow ($ billion) 
  Cumulative 
flows 
(1975-2004) 
Equity 
revalued 
cumulative 
flows 
(at mark. 
value) 
FDI 
revalued 
with 
discounting 
for 
dividends 
IIP 
(at 
end 
2004) 
Unexplained 
(IIP 2004 
minus 
cumulated 
flows) 
Average 
age 
(average 
year of 
investment) 
FDI US            
            
FDI flows in US: of which          
Equity+reinvested 
earnings 
1,675 3,208 2,260  2,182  -78  1,997 
US portfolio inflows: of which          
Equity  794 1,141    2,071  930  1,999 
Portfolio debt:  4,111     4,250  139   
(of which bonds 
and notes) 
          
          
Other investment  3,641      3,507  -133   
            
US DIA            
           
US FDI outflows: of which          
Equity+reinvested 
earnings 
1,871 3,636 2,986  3,070  84  1,997 
US portfolio outflows: of which          
equity  1,064 1,165   2,520  1,355  1,998 
Portfolio debt:  540     917  377   
(of which bonds 
and notes) 
         
           
Other investment  2,602        3,059  457    
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•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
  Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS Annual Conference) and internet and media 
relations.